What about the giant mutatant ants?

The political activity of the scientist movement after August 1945 illustrates in sharp relief how the notion of being a scientist had broken completely from its pre-modern roots. Once upon a time, the scientist was the natural philosopher; usually the curious aristocrat or someone with a theological background. It would have been considered well within that person’s range to expound on any number of topics, from science to philosophy to politics to religion. But by 1945 this is no longer the case. The formalization and specialization of the modern scientist meant they had become more qualified than ever to discuss their area of expertise. But it also meant that area of expertise had become ever narrower and they were less qualified than ever to pontificate on topics beyond that narrow expertise.

Boyer’s book also highlights the rise of big science and the eagerness of so many scientists to bind themselves to military-industrial-government complex as long as it meant more money for them to pursue their research. I think this represents one of the fundamental reasons that there has been considerable public disaffection with the intellectual class in general (at least in America). The zeal with which the scientists pursued more government funding was matched only by their belief that their opinions should outweigh those of the people who happen to be paying the bills. This is the exact opposite of how most of America has traditionally operated. I think the lack of recognition (and in many cases, the complete lack of any respect) for their unique circumstance has often harmed the efforts of intellectuals in all fields to shape public opinion and policy.

I’m not sure what it says about our society that there are still significant disagreements over whether the use of the atomic bombs was justified. Maybe it doesn’t really say much about society and just means that it’s a tricky question. One thing I’ve wondered is whether you could make the case that dropping the two bombs on Japan at the very end of WWII might have been the best way to ensure that they weren’t used again in Korea or some other conflict that might have quickly followed WWII. As a contemporary example, the use of poison gas was one of the more horrific aspects of WWI. In the interwar years, research on those weapons continued and when WWII broke out, everyone on both sides assumed it was only a matter of time before the gas was used. But it never happened. The horror of the gas attacks during the first war had built up a resistance among the leaders to using it again and they basically adopted the notion of ‘if you don’t use it, we won’t use it’. If no atomic bombs had been dropped during WWII and if there had been no significant public testing over the next few years, how much more willing would Truman have been to use a bomb in Korea? Could he have justified not using a weapon that would help win that war if the public hadn’t already seen the damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

The range of topics in Boyer’s book is rather astounding, especially given the short time frame in which he is dealing. But personally I wish he would’ve extended the time frame a little further to incorporate some of the fantastic sci-fi movies of the 1950’s. Any study of the bomb’s effect on American culture that doesn’t include “Them!” just can’t be considered complete.

Advertisement